Ilya Segal

16 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.

ORCID: 0000-0001-8605-3020

Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Publications

• Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study — Management Science 2024
• Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation — Journal of Political Economy 2020
• Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities — The Review of Economic Studies 2019
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach — Econometrica 2014 (name-matched, not ORCID-linked)
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism — Econometrica 2013 (name-matched, not ORCID-linked)
• Optimal Information Disclosure — Journal of Political Economy 2010
• Antitrust in Innovative Industries — American Economic Review 2007
• Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games — American Economic Review 2007
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining — The Review of Economic Studies 2003
• Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand — American Economic Review 2003
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities — Econometrica 2003
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets — Econometrica 2002
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing) — Econometrica 2002
• Naked Exclusion: Comment — American Economic Review 2000
• Contracting with Externalities — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts — The Review of Economic Studies 1999