Parag A. Pathak

28 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.

ORCID: 0000-0001-8621-3864

Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Publications

• Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing — Management Science 2024
• Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design — American Economic Review 2024
• Reversing Reserves — Management Science 2023
• The Long-Term Effects of Universal Preschool in Boston — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2023
• The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools — American Economic Review 2021
• The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice — American Economic Review 2021
• Do Parents Value School Effectiveness? — American Economic Review 2020
• Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones — Journal of Political Economy 2018
• The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match — American Economic Review 2017
• Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2017
• Erratum to “Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation” — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2017
• Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools — American Economic Review 2017
• Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation — Econometrica 2017
• Interpreting Tests of School VAM Validity — American Economic Review 2016
• Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston — American Economic Review 2016
• Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts — Journal of Political Economy 2014
• Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2013
• The market for borrowing corporate bonds — Journal of Financial Economics 2013
• School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation — American Economic Review 2013
• Forced Sales and House Prices — American Economic Review 2011
• Inputs and Impacts in Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn — American Economic Review 2010
• The Impact of Commissions on Home Sales in Greater Boston — American Economic Review 2010
• Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets — American Economic Review 2009
• Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism — American Economic Review 2008
• The Dynamics of Open-Source Contributors — American Economic Review 2006
• The New York City High School Match — American Economic Review 2005
• The Boston Public School Match — American Economic Review 2005
• Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design — Econometrica