Roger Myerson

8 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.

ORCID: 0000-0003-0254-7184

Department of Economics, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago

Publications

• Perfect Conditionalε-Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions — Econometrica 2020
• Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers — Journal of Political Economy 2017
• Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria — Econometrica 2015
• Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy — Econometrica 2015
• A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles — Journal of Political Economy 2012
• Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory — American Economic Review 2008
• Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures — American Economic Review 1999
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria — The Review of Economic Studies 1986