Takuo Sugaya

13 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.

ORCID: 0000-0001-5104-5469

Stanford Graduate School of Business , United States

Publications

• Collusion with Optimal Information Disclosure — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2026
• Mediated Collusion — Journal of Political Economy 2024
• Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games — Econometrica 2023
• Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach — Econometrica 2022
• Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring — The Review of Economic Studies 2022
• Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990–99 — The Review of Economic Studies 2022
• The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games — The Review of Economic Studies 2021
• Communication and Community Enforcement — Journal of Political Economy 2021
• A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information — American Economic Review 2020
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching — Econometrica 2020
• Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2020
• Maintaining Privacy in Cartels — Journal of Political Economy 2018
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem — Econometrica 2011