Thomas Palfrey
21 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.
ORCID: 0000-0003-0769-8109
California Institute of Technology
Publications
- Cursed Sequential Equilibrium — American Economic Review 2025
- Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited — Journal of Political Economy 2024
- Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory — Econometrica 2019
- Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments — American Economic Review 2014
- Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes — Journal of Political Economy 2012
- Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets With Information Flows — Econometrica 2012
- The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory — The Review of Economic Studies 2010
- Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections — American Economic Review 2008
- Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees — American Economic Review 2008
- Self-Correcting Information Cascades — The Review of Economic Studies 2007
- Federal Mandates by Popular Demand — Journal of Political Economy 2000
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods — Econometrica 1999
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms — The Review of Economic Studies 1994
- Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study — The Review of Economic Studies 1994
- A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games — Journal of the American Statistical Association 1993
- Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem — Journal of Political Economy 1989
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations — The Review of Economic Studies 1987
- Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit — The Review of Economic Studies 1985
- Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination — The Journal of Finance 1984
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry — The Review of Economic Studies 1984
- Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis — Management Science 1980