Yeon-Koo Che
28 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.
ORCID: 0000-0002-8985-2554
Publications
- Optimal Queue Design — Journal of Political Economy 2026 (name-matched, not ORCID-linked)
- Evaluating the Impact of Privacy Regulation on E-Commerce Firms: Evidence from Apple’s App Tracking Transparency — Management Science 2026
- Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods — The Review of Economic Studies 2025
- “Near” Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima — Econometrica 2024
- Bailout Stigma — The Journal of Finance 2024
- Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem with Ambiguity — American Economic Review 2024
- Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion — Journal of Political Economy 2023
- Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation — The Review of Economic Studies 2021
- Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention — American Economic Review 2019
- Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets — Journal of Political Economy 2019
- Stable Matching in Large Economies — Econometrica 2019
- Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2018
- Decentralized College Admissions — Journal of Political Economy 2016
- Pandering to Persuade — American Economic Review 2013
- Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications — American Economic Review 2013
- Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach — Econometrica 2013
- Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents — The Review of Economic Studies 2013
- Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered — American Economic Review 2011
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms — Econometrica 2010
- Bidding with Securities: Comment — American Economic Review 2010
- Opinions as Incentives — Journal of Political Economy 2009
- Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply — American Economic Review 2006
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation — Econometrica 2006
- A Dynamic Theory of Holdup — Econometrica 2004
- Optimal Design of Research Contests — American Economic Review 2003
- Optimal Incentives for Teams — American Economic Review 2001
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting — American Economic Review 1999
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders — The Review of Economic Studies 1998