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The performance of acquisitions of founder CEO firms: The effect of founder firm premium

M. V. Shyam Kumar, Nandu J. Nagarajan, Frederik P. Schlingemann

Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal · 2021 · Volume 15 · Issue 4

DOI: 10.1002/sej.1371

Abstract

We study the market performance of acquirers of targets that are public founder CEO firms. Using a switching regression model, we first estimate the unique value embedded in these targets due to founder presence, which we term “Founder Firm Premium.” We find Founder Firm Premium was positively associated with founder CEO departure ex-post, and was negatively associated with acquirer abnormal returns. Our results suggest that the while acquirers pay for founder human capital upfront, they may not necessarily appropriate the associated value ex-post, and that this uncertainty significantly influences acquisition performance. Additionally we illustrate the tradeoffs involved in founder CEO acquisitions, while drawing attention to the need for differentiating between professional and entrepreneurial human capital in acquisitions. What risks do acquirers face when buying targets that are founder CEO firms? Founder CEO firms provide access to the human capital of founders and the distinctive organizations these individuals have built over time. However, founder CEOs are also difficult to retain, making it challenging for acquirers to capture the unique value and the associated premium embedded in these firms. We show that founder retention risks play a central role and can result in investors discounting these acquisitions. However, we also find that the non-founder resources these firms possess in various functional areas can be an important source of value creation in these transactions. Acquirers thus need to be aware of these tradeoffs, while integrating founder CEO firms differently from professional CEO firms.

Keywords

acquisitions, event study, founder CEO, human capital theory, life cycle theory

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