Affect in Dyadic Negotiation: A Model and Propositions

Abstract

The topic of affect has been described as an important, but underexplored area of the social psychology of negotiation. In this paper we seek to advance thinking about affective processes in two-party negotiation through an integration and conceptual extension of existing research. We briefly review conceptualizations and operationalizations of affect, and highlight findings relevant to the social-cognitive underpinnings of negotiation. A dynamic model of affect in two-party negotiation analyzes the role of moods and emotions that bargainers bring to and evolve within the negotiation encounter. The model illustrates how affect states influence (and in some cases are influenced by) one's decision to negotiate, selection of an opponent, formulation of expectations and offers, choice of tactics used within bargaining, economic and social-cognitive outcomes, and proclivity to comply with settlement terms. We develop specific research propositions that describe these influences and discuss their implications for broader questions about the role of affect in bargaining.