The Disjunction Effect and Reason-Based Choice in Games1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · 1999 · Volume 80 · Issue 2
Abstract
This paper reports an experiment that extends previous find ings of the disjunction effect, sometimes described as a violation of Savage's sure-thing principle. Evidence of the disjunction ef fect is observed using elicited beliefs about others' actions (rather than controlled beliefs) in a prisoners' dilemma studied by Shafir and Tversky (1992) as well as in an asymmetric version of it and in a nondilemma game with a unique equilibrium. Debiasing tech niques as well as implications for these extensions are discussed.
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