Working Together but in Opposition: An Examination of the “Good-Cop/Bad-Cop” Negotiating Team Tactic

Abstract

Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar “good cop/bad cop” distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role differentiation designed to enhance a team's success at the bargaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model (Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators' decision tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a person's initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini, 1984) and supports the model's usefulness as an approximate representation of negotiator cognition.