Top executive compensation: Equity or excess? Implications for regaining American competitiveness
Bruce Walters, Tim Hardin, James Schick
Journal of Business Ethics · 1995 · Volume 14 · Issue 3
Abstract
The debate over compensation packages for top executives is discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the decoupling of CEO pay and organizational performance. A contrast is drawn between firms that are owner-controlled and those that are manager-controlled. Owner-controlled firms tend to be more market-driven. In manager-controlled firms, however, ownership can become diluted to the point where decisions may not always be in the best interest of shareholders. The process of determining CEO compensation packages is examined, and special attention is given to the handling of stock options. In order to stem the threat of increased government intervention, suggestions are made for increasing the leverage of compensation committees and of shareholders in general.
Keywords
Economic Growth, Government Intervention, Good Interest, Organizational Performance, Stock Option
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