Bribery as an organizational response to conflicting environmental expectations
Randall K. Hess, Edgar W. Kossack
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · 1981 · Volume 9 · Issue 3
Abstract
This article develops a conceptualization of bribery activity in organizational relationships at the international level. Utilizing a coalitional viewpoint of organizational interaction across markets, this paper proposes that international exchange environments are dimensioned by two critical factors: environmental constraints formed by cultural expectations and management capability to resolve incongruent exchange demands on the international marketing organization. These factors are proposed as determinants of a model of bribery behavior comprising four international exchange environments. Bribery activity in each environment is examined as a form of “side payment substitution” for unresolvable demands, representing a rational response to conflicting payment requirements and expectations.
Keywords
Foreign Market, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Agent, Multinational Enterprise, Organizational Response
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