Deadly Drugs and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Reply to Tully

Journal of Business Ethics · 2006 · Volume 68 · Issue 2

Abstract

In a recent contribution to this journal, Patrick Tully criticizes my view that the doctrine of double effect does not prohibit a pharmaceutical company from selling a drug that has potentially fatal side-effects and that does not treat a life-threatening condition. Tully alleges my account is too permissive and makes the doctrine irrelevant to decisions about selling harmful products. In the following paper, I respond to Tully’s objections and show that he misinterprets my position and misstates some elements of the doctrine of double effect. I also show how the doctrine constrains some decisions about marketing drugs with potentially fatal side-effects.

Keywords

consequentialism, foreseen effect, formal cooperation, intended effect, intention, intrinsic evil, material cooperation, natural law, principle of double effect, proportionality

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