CEO incentives and the health of defined benefit pension plans
Joy Begley, Sandra Chamberlain, Shuo Yang, Jenny Li Zhang
Review of Accounting Studies · 2015 · Volume 20 · Issue 3
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9332-0
Abstract
We examine the relation between CEO pay-related wealth and the funding levels, and freezing decisions, of defined benefit pension plans. Results show that higher funding levels occur when CEOs are most endowed in employee pension plans, but that spillover endowments in supplemental executive plans coincide with the lowest funding levels. CEO equity-wealth correlates with funding health in between the extremes. Further, “hard freezes” of employee plans are less likely, the larger the CEO’s total pension interest (in executive and employee plans together). This suggests that CEOs fear repercussions to their own pension plan when employee plans are frozen.
Keywords
Defined benefit plans, Earnings management, Pension plan governance
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