Distinguishing choice and subjective probability estimation processes: Implications for theories of judgment and for cross-cultural comparisons

Abstract

Research on subjective probability (SP) often focuses on the difference between the fraction of correct binary choices and the SP that they are correct or on the deviation of the calibration curve from the diagonal. On the assumption that choice and SP judgments reflect different, albeit closely related, processes, it is important to analyze the two sources of data separately. This article uses data collected by Yates, Lee, Shinotsuka, Patalano, and Sieck (1998) from Chinese, Japanese, and Americans to demonstrate the advantages of doing so and to yield new conclusions regarding cross-cultural comparisons of judgment. One new result is that a discrete threshold model with an error term best described the choice data of all groups. From their analyses, Yates et al. (1998) had concluded that the Chinese were more overconfident than the American or Japanese. According to the present results, the Chinese appeared either more overconfident or more underconfident, depending on how the data are analyzed. The dual outcome is a consequence of the greater variability both in their SP judgments and in their binary choices. Additionally, the Chinese participants’ choices and SPs were more responsive to the base rate than were those of the other groups.