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A discussion of ‘corporate disclosure by family firms’

Amy P. Hutton

Journal of Accounting and Economics · 2007 · Volume 44 · Issue 1-2

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.004

Abstract

Using a unique empirical setting, family firms in the S&P 500, Ali et al. [Ali, A., Chen, T.-Y., Radhakrishnan, S., 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.006] contribute to a growing body of research on the relation between corporate governance and corporate disclosure quality. Using an indicator variable for sub-sample membership as an instrument for differing agency costs, the authors interpret their findings as consistent with family firms facing lower overall agency costs and providing higher quality corporate disclosures. However, their empirical findings are open to alternative interpretations and in totality present relatively weak, indirect evidence of a relation between corporate governance and the quality of corporate disclosure.

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