Do insiders time management buyouts and freezeouts to buy undervalued targets?
Jarrad Harford, Jared Stanfield, Feng Zhang
Journal of Financial Economics · 2019 · Volume 131 · Issue 1
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.010
Abstract
We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the 12-month period following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk factors or empirical methodologies, but exhibit significant heterogeneity across deals. Additional tests show that, on average, abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Further, MBOs and freezeouts are announced during troughs of industry profitability.
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