Dissecting bankruptcy frictions
Winston Wei Dou, Lucian A. Taylor, Wei Wang, Wenyu Wang
Journal of Financial Economics · 2021 · Volume 142 · Issue 3
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.014
Abstract
How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy inefficiencies, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small.
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