Punitive supervision and productivity: An experimental analog

Abstract

Concerns an unexplored aspect of the relationship between supervision and worker productivity the manner in which the supervisor's activities are scheduled. A laboratory setting provided an analog to the supervisor's use of 1 type of consequence, punishment to maximize the amount of time a worker spends in task activity while minimizing various unauthorized behaviors. The setting involved 2 concurrent operants reinforced with money where work on the higher paying one was penalized at various intervals. The effects of variations in the schedule of these intervals and the size of the penalties were explored. Results indicated that penalty magnitude significantly affected the allocation of work time when the penalties occurred at unequal intervals but not at equal ones. Under the unequal condition, the higher the penalties the less time spent on the punished task and the greater the time on the unpunished one. Low and moderate penalties, however, produced less work on the unpunished task than would be predicted on the basis of the possible losses through penalties. (15 ref.) (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)