Assortative Matching and Search
Econometrica · 2000 · Volume 68 · Issue 2
Abstract
In Becker's (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortaive if types are complements: i.e., match outputf(x,y) issupermodularinxandy. We reprise this famous result assuming time-intensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker's conditions on match output no longer suffice for assortative matching, we find sufficient conditions valid for any search frictions and type distribution: supermodularity not only of outputf, but also of logfxand logfxy. Symmetric submodularity conditions imply negatively assortative matching. Examples show these conditions are necessary.
Keywords
Search frictions, matching, assignment.
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