An Experimental Investigation of Retention and Rotation Requirements

Abstract

We provide results from an experiment designed to assess whether mandatory rotation and/or retention of auditors increases auditors' independence by reducing their willingness to issue reports biased in favor of management. Auditors' reporting is compared across the following four regimes: one that does not require either rotation or retention, a second that requires retention only, a third that requires rotation only, and a fourth that requires both rotation and retention. We find that the rotation requirements in the third and fourth regimes decreased auditor-subjects' willingness to issue biased reports, relative to the two regimes in which rotation was not imposed. In these other two regimes, however, many manager-subjects voluntarily retained the same auditor-subjects over multi-periods. While the long running interactions between manager- and auditor-subjects resulted in more favorable reports by auditor-subjects (a lower level of independence), the established relationships also induced manager-subjects to make higher investments.