Timing Isn't Everything: How Public Service and Self-Serving Goals Influence Auditor Voice TacticsLe calendrier n'est pas tout : influence des buts désintéressés et intéressés sur les stratégies axées sur la voix des auditeurs

Abstract

Auditors are required to raise potential audit issues to their supervisor's attention (i.e., to speak up). Speaking up allows supervisors to adjust audit procedures as needed to protect audit quality. We argue that the act of speaking up may not always be sufficient to protect audit quality—howauditors speak up is critical. Drawing on audit voice theory (AVT), which focuses onwhetherauditors speak up, we consider the impact of auditors' salient goals on the tactics that auditors use when raising issues. Using a survey, multiple experiments, and an association study, we find that staff auditors with salient public service (vs. self-serving) goals choose more quality-enhancing voice tactics when speaking up. Importantly, however, we find that the voice-related decisions of auditors with salient self-serving (but not public service) goals respond to rewards for more quality-enhancing tactics. These results support our theory that auditors approach voice differently depending on their salient goals, and they imply that supervisors can help auditors choose quality-enhancing voice tactics even when self-serving goals are salient. Overall, our findings test and extend AVT, identify a potential shortcoming of current audit standards, and suggest ways that firms can improve team communication and audit quality via recruitment strategies, team management practices, and training.