Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Ying Chen, Navin Kartik, Joel Sobel
Econometrica · 2008 · Volume 76 · Issue 1
DOI: 10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x
Abstract
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford–Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap-talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework.
Keywords
Cheap talk, babbling, equilibrium selection, almost-cheap talk
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