Behavioural Agency and Firm Productivity: Revisiting the Incentive Alignment Qualities of Stock Options
Leon Zolotoy, Don O’Sullivan, Geoffrey P. Martin
Journal of Management Studies · 2022 · Volume 59 · Issue 7
Abstract
Drawing on behavioural agency theory, we revisit the incentive alignment qualities of stock options. Using behavioural agency’s logic, we theorize that chief executive officers (CEOs) are likely to perceive efforts directed at firm productivity as a means of protecting their option wealth (the value of previously awarded stock options). Our reasoning suggests that CEO option wealth positively influences firm productivity and that productivity mediates the relationship between CEO option wealth and firm value. Our theory also points to boundary conditions at the CEO level and the firm level. Our study advances research on the utility of stock options by focusing on effort and productivity as the mechanism through which option incentives affect CEO behaviours. We demonstrate that option risk bearing can align CEO–shareholder interests.
Keywords
behavioural agency, CEO stock options, executive compensation, productivity
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