Buyer-seller relationships in the procurement of logistical services
Robert Dahlstrom, Kevin M. McNeilly, Thomas W. Speh
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · 1996 · Volume 24 · Issue 2
Abstract
This study presents a two-phase model of interfirm exchange in the logistical supply industry. The first phase uses transaction cost analysis to identify conditions leading to market-based transactions, unilateral agreements, and bilateral alliances. The second phase illustrates how formal controls and relational norms yield performance in market, unilateral, and bilateral governance systems. A test of the model with data from 189 logistical supply relationships suggests that bilateral alliances emerge through the interaction of user investments in the logistics supplier, supplier logistical services, and marketplace uncertainty. Bilateral alliances attain desired outcomes through participative management and flexibility. By contrast, market-based transactions yield desired outcomes through formalization and solidarity. Unilateral agreements gain performance through formalization, participation, information sharing, and solidarity. Implications for logistics management and theory are discussed.
Keywords
Formal Control, Relational Norm, Logistical Service, Governance Mode, Market Science Spring
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.