The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
American Economic Review · 2004 · Volume 94 · Issue 4
Abstract
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i. e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
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