Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework
American Economic Review · 2014 · Volume 104 · Issue 1
Abstract
Many observers argue that political polarization, particularly on social and cultural issues, has increased in the United States. How does this influence the political competition on economic issues? We analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share. In equilibrium, candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically-liberal voters, as well as socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters. We analyze how voters' cultural preferences and candidates' cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions.
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Fiscal Policy, National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology, Social and Economic Stratification
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