On the Selection of Arbitrators
Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Brian Knight
American Economic Review · 2014 · Volume 104 · Issue 11
Abstract
A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-listing procedure.
Keywords
Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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