Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Francesco Trebbi
American Economic Review · 2014 · Volume 104 · Issue 12
Abstract
Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how both are at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyists follow politicians they were initially connected to when those politicians switch to new committee assignments. In support of the expertise view, we show that there is a group of experts that even politicians of opposite political affiliation listen to. However, we find a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise. (JEL D72, D82)
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
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