Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?
American Economic Review · 2015 · Volume 105 · Issue 8
Abstract
This paper examines how divorce laws affect couples' intertemporal choices and well-being. Exploiting panel variation in US laws, I estimate the parameters of a model of household decision-making. Household survey data indicate that the introduction of unilateral divorce in states that imposed an equal division of property is associated with higher household savings and lower female employment, implying a distortion in household assets accumulation and a transfer toward wives whose share in household resources is smaller than the one of their husband. When spouses share consumption equally, separate property or prenuptial agreements can reduce distortions and increase equity. (JEL D13, D14, D91, J12, J16, K36)
Keywords
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation, Household Saving, Personal Finance, Intertemporal Household Choice, Life Cycle Models and Saving, Marriage, Marital Dissolution, Family Structure, Domestic Abuse, Economics of Gender, Non-labor Discrimination, Family and Personal Law
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