Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
American Economic Review · 2015 · Volume 105 · Issue 1
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers. (JEL C93, D02, D72, K42, O17)
Keywords
Field Experiments, Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements
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