Clientelism in Indian Villages
Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois, Ashok Kotwal
American Economic Review · 2015 · Volume 105 · Issue 6
Abstract
We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities, Redistributive Effects, Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs, Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs, Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants, Non-labor Discrimination, Economic Development: Human Resources, Human Development, Income Distribution, Migration, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements, Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis, Housing, Infrastructure
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