Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism
Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, Mariano Sigman
American Economic Review · 2015 · Volume 105 · Issue 11
Abstract
We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83)
Keywords
Noncooperative Games, Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, Altruism, Philanthropy, Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief, Unawareness
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