Team-Specific Capital and Innovation
Xavier Jaravel, Neviana Petkova, Alex Bell
American Economic Review · 2018 · Volume 108 · Issue 4-5
Abstract
We establish the importance of team-specific capital in the typical inventor's career. Using administrative tax and patent data for the population of US patent inventors from 1996 to 2012, we find that an inventor's premature death causes a large and long-lasting decline in their co-inventor's earnings and citation-weighted patents (–4 percent and –15 percent after 8 years, respectively). After ruling out firm disruption, network effects, and top-down spillovers as main channels, we show that the effect is driven by close-knit teams and that team-specific capital largely results from an "experience" component increasing collaboration value over time.
Keywords
Human Capital, Skills, Occupational Choice, Labor Productivity, Wage Level and Structure, Wage Differentials, Personnel Economics: Labor Management, Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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