The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire
American Economic Review · 2018 · Volume 108 · Issue 11
Abstract
I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854-1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.
Keywords
Bureaucracy, Administrative Processes in Public Organizations, Corruption, Colonialism, Imperialism, Postcolonialism, Public Administration, Public Sector Accounting and Audits, Public Sector Labor Markets, Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions, Promotions, Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: Pre-1913, and Regulation: Europe: 1913-
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.