Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services
Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, Scott S. Lee
American Economic Review · 2020 · Volume 110 · Issue 5
Abstract
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.
Keywords
Public Administration, Public Sector Accounting and Audits, Analysis of Health Care Markets, Health Insurance, Public and Private, Human Capital, Skills, Occupational Choice, Labor Productivity, Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions, Promotions, Economic Development: Human Resources, Human Development, Income Distribution, Migration, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology, Language, Social and Economic Stratification
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