Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence
Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Francesco Trebbi
American Economic Review · 2020 · Volume 110 · Issue 7
Abstract
We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.
Keywords
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis, Altruism, Philanthropy, Intergenerational Transfers, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Nonprofit Institutions, NGOs, Social Entrepreneurship
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.