Vulnerability and Clientelism
Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter
American Economic Review · 2022 · Volume 112 · Issue 11
Abstract
This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. Second, we exploit rainfall shocks. We find that reducing vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism.
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Public Goods, Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs, Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs, Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements, Climate, Natural Disasters and Their Management, Global Warming
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