Unobserved-Offers Bargaining
American Economic Review · 2023 · Volume 113 · Issue 1
Abstract
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players' preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection. In repeated ultimatum bargaining, the responding party can obtain a positive payoff if his signal of the opponent's offer is also observed by the opponent herself, but not if his signal is private. In alternating-offers bargaining, a player is better off when her own offers are observed more precisely and her opponent's offers are observed less precisely. Possible applications include international relations, regulation, principal-agency, and product quality provision.
Keywords
Stochastic and Dynamic Games, Evolutionary Games, Repeated Games, Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
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