Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
American Economic Review · 2025 · Volume 115 · Issue 12
Abstract
I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.
Keywords
Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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