Polity Size and Local Government Performance: Evidence from India
Veda Narasimhan, Jeffrey Weaver
American Economic Review · 2024 · Volume 114 · Issue 11
Abstract
Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization (polity size) using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture.
Keywords
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Public Goods, State and Local Government: Health, Education, Welfare, Public Pensions, State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements, Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis, Housing, Infrastructure, Regional Government Analysis: General
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