Similarity of Information and Collective Action
Deepal Basak, Joyee Deb, Aditya Kuvalekar
American Economic Review · 2026 · Volume 116 · Issue 4
Abstract
We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision.
Keywords
Cooperative Games, Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design, Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief, Unawareness, Public Goods
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