Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions
American Economic Review · 2001 · Volume 91 · Issue 1
Abstract
Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argue that industrial use of federally funded research would be reduced without university patent licensing. Our survey of U.S. universities supports this view, emphasizing the embryonic state of most technologies licensed and the need for inventor cooperation in commercialization. Thus, for most university inventions, there is a moral-hazard problem with inventor effort. For such inventions, development does not occur unless the inventor's income is tied to the licensee's output by payments such as royalties or equity. Sponsored research from the licensee cannot by itself solve this problem.
Keywords
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, Technological Change: Government Policy
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