Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules
American Economic Review · 2007 · Volume 97 · Issue 1
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)
Keywords
Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations, Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.