Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz
American Economic Review · 2007 · Volume 97 · Issue 1
Abstract
We investigate the "generalized second-price" (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. (JEL D44, L81, M37)
Keywords
Auctions, Retail and Wholesale Trade, e-Commerce, Advertising
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.