Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
American Economic Review · 2016 · Volume 106 · Issue 5
Abstract
A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
Keywords
Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design, Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief, Unawareness
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