Guns, Latrines, and Land Reform: Dynamic Pigouvian Taxation
American Economic Review · 2016 · Volume 106 · Issue 5
Abstract
Dynamically and statically optimal Pigouvian subsidies and taxes on durables will differ in a growing economy. In a dynamic game, consumers may delay purchasing durables with positive externalities, such as latrines, anticipating greater future subsidies. Governments can most cheaply induce optimal purchasing by commiting to make subsidies temporary. Foreign donors may make commitment impossible, generating delays in private investment that more than fully offset the social benefits of transfers. Anticipated future taxes or regulation of durables with negative externalities, such as guns, may encourage current purchase, potentially causing policymakers who would otherwise prefer taxes or regulation to abandon such policies.
Keywords
Externalities, Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency, Optimal Taxation, Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities, Redistributive Effects, Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue, Health: Government Policy, Regulation, Public Health, Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Noise, Hazardous Waste, Solid Waste, Recycling
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