Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer
American Economic Review · 2017 · Volume 107 · Issue 5
Abstract
We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
Keywords
Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory, Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design, Economics of Contract: Theory
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