The Role of Marriage in Fighting HIV: A Quantitative Illustration for Malawi
Jeremy Greenwood, Philipp Kircher, Cezar Santos, Michèle Tertilt
American Economic Review · 2017 · Volume 107 · Issue 5
Abstract
How might policies that promote marriage and/or dissuade divorce help in the fight against HIV/AIDS? This question is addressed employing a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model, using Malawi as a case study. In the framework developed, individuals can choose between married and single life. A single person can select among abstinence and sex with or without a condom. The results suggest that marriage-friendly policies can help to abate HIV/AIDS. The policy predictions that obtain from general equilibrium analysis are compared with those that arise from simulated synthetic field experiments and epidemiological studies.
Keywords
Health Behavior, Health: Government Policy, Regulation, Public Health, Marriage, Marital Dissolution, Family Structure, Domestic Abuse, Economics of Gender, Non-labor Discrimination, Economic Development: Human Resources, Human Development, Income Distribution, Migration
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