Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show
Uyanga Turmunkh, Martijn J. van den Assem, Dennie van Dolder
Management Science · 2019 · Volume 65 · Issue 10
Abstract
We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.
Keywords
deception, lying aversion, game show, prisoner’s dilemma, communication, cooperation, cheap talk
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